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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the interaction of two populations with a large number of
indistinguishable agents. The problem consists in two levels: the interaction between agents of
a same population, and the interaction between the two populations. In the spirit of mean field
type control (MFC) problems and mean field games (MFG), each population is approximated by
a continuum of infinitesimal agents. We define four different problems in a general context and
interpret them in the framework of MFC or MFG. By calculus of variations, we derive formally
in each case the adjoint equations for the necessary conditions of optimality. Importantly, we
find that in the case of a competition between two coalitions, one needs to rely on a system
of master equations in order to describe the equilibrium. Examples are provided, in particular
linear-quadratic models for which we obtain systems of ODEs that can be related to Riccati
equations.
1 Introduction
1.1 General introduction
The evolution of a large group of interacting agents, who are trying to realize a certain goal either
from an individual or a social viewpoint, is an important and interesting question in mathematics,
physics and many other fields. When the number of agents grows to infinity, it becomes extremely
hard to keep track of all the agent-to-agent interactions and to study the resulting global behavior.
However, by assuming that every agent has the same importance, the impact of each single agent’s
choice on the group decreases as the size of the population increases. So, in order to efficiently
approximate the global evolution of the group, one can replace the influences of all the other
players on a given agent by their average influence. This is called mean field approach, whose
name is borrowed from statistical physics. This approach is valid under some assumptions (in
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particular the one asserting that all the players have indistinguishable roles among the population)
and allows to replace the microscopic viewpoint by a macroscopic one. The main advantage of such
an approximation is that the macroscopic description is more tractable and in particular amenable
to numerical treatment. Moreover, the larger the number of individuals, the more accurate the
approximation.
Based on the idea of mean field approach, two important theories have recently emerged: mean
field games (MFG) and mean field (type) control problems (MFC). Both of them study the behavior
of a typical agent via the evolution of her state and the cost induced by this evolution. One can
characterize the optimal control of this representative player by two coupled equations: a forward
one, describing her dynamics (or, equivalently, the dynamics of the population), and a backward
one, describing the evolution of her value function. Depending on whether one uses analytical or
stochastic methods, partial differential equations (PDEs) or stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
are obtained respectively. For more details, the reader can refer to [8] for the general theory, [30]
for the regularity theory of the PDE system, and [13, 14] for the stochastic analysis.
There are several important differences between these two theories that have to be emphasized.
(1) Mean field games correspond to the limit of differential games, in which one wants to find
Nash equilibria, when the number of players tend to infinity. They describe the global behavior of
the group resulting from the selfish choices that individuals are making so as to minimize a certain
cost (or maximize a certain benefit). This cost depends on the state of the agent and also on the
statistical distribution of all the agents’ states, that is, the global state of the system. Mean field
game models have been introduced on the one hand by Lasry and Lions [45, 46, 47, 50, 32] (see
also [12] for a written account of Lions’ lectures at Colle`ge de France), and on the other hand by
Caines, Huang and Malhame´ [33, 34, 38, 39, 35, 36]. They have since then attracted a lot of interest.
Some important applications can be found in finance [47, 4, 42, 18], economy [31, 29, 43, 19, 2, 28],
systemic risk [27, 17], energy production [32, 20], or crowd motion [50, 44, 3].
(2) Another kind of asymptotic regime leads to mean field type control problems, which are
stochastic optimal control problems where the cost function and the parameters of the dynamics
depend on the law of the controlled stochastic process. In general, such problems correspond to
the control of a large number of agents by a global planner. The problem is to find an optimal
feedback rule that she can provide to all the agents, who then implement it in a distributed fashion.
This type of problem can also be regarded as the problem of a single player who tries to optimize
a cost involving the law of her own state, which evolves with a Mc-Kean Vlasov (MKV) dynamics.
Depending on which of the two viewpoints one chooses, this theory is referred to mean field (type)
control (e.g., by Bensoussan, Frehse, and Yam) or control of Mc-Kean Vlasov dynamics (e.g., by
Carmona and Delarue). It has found applications such as risk management, portfolio management,
or cybersecurity [25, 24, 51, 40].
In this paper, we will investigate the interaction of two populations with a large number of
indistinguishable agents, which is a natural extension of the aforementioned theories. In this type of
problems, two (or more) large populations interact and the behavior of each group is approximated
using a mean field approach. This idea has been broached by several authors since the original
contribution of Huang, Caines and Malhame´ [38]. In [26], Feleqi has derived an adjoint system of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Kolmogorov-Fokker-Plank for the ergodic mean field game theory
of several populations, by letting the number of members of each group go to infinity. In [21, 22]
and [7], existence and uniqueness results for this type of systems with Neumann boundary conditions
have been proved, in the stationary and the dynamic case respectively. In [1], Achdou, Bardi and
Cirant introduced a MFG model describing the interactions between two populations in urban
settlements and residential choice. They showed the existence of solutions for both stationary and
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evolution cases with periodic boundary conditions, and provided some numerical simulations. For
a synthetic presentation, we refer the reader to the monographs [8] (Chapter 8) and [13] (Chapter
7). To the best of our knowledge, mean field control problems with several populations have
been considered only in [44] and [6], where the authors introduced models for crowd motion (with
local and non-local interactions respectively). They studied optimality conditions and provided
numerical results.
Despite the increasing research activities on this topic, a global viewpoint was still missing:
multi-population MFC problems have been considered only on some examples, and even in the
more studied multi-population MFG setting, the problems were of a relatively special type due to
the form of the Hamiltonians. The goal of the present paper is to introduce a general framework to
tackle multi-population mean field control problems and mean field games. To this end, we consider
two types of interactions, cooperation or competition, between two populations and between agents
of one population. At a heuristic level, we can summarize as follows the different cases.
(1) In the same population, if the agents cooperate each other, one obtains a mean field control
problem (or control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics), whereas if they compete, one obtains a mean
field game. In this paper, we only consider the case that different groups have the same type of
interaction between their own agents.
(2) For two populations, if the interaction is cooperation, there is only one single objective
function to optimize and the equilibrium between the two groups should be of social type. If it is
competition, each group optimizes its own objective function and we look for a Nash equilibrium
between the two populations.
Therefore, we will study four different cases of two population interactions in this paper. For
each of them, we will describe the control problems and derive the associated system of PDEs by
calculus of variation. Moreover the adjoint equations can also be deduced from the so-called master
equation [48, 49, 9, 10, 16, 52, 53]. We will also explain generalizations of this approach for two
populations.
For the sake of clarity, we will consider the interactions between only two populations but
the ideas could be generalized to a larger number of populations. To alleviate the notations, we
will assume that each population represents the same proportion of the total population but more
complex situations could be tackled in a similar way. Furthermore, we will focus on the mean field
limit and will not discuss the models with a finite number of agents.
1.2 Mathematical framework
In the sequel, we will consider two populations with densities (x, t) 7→ mi(x, t), i = 1, 2 and
x ∈ Rn. We note by m the vector (m1,m2)
∗, where the superscript ∗ denotes the transpose of a
vector or a matrix. We note by mt the function x 7→ m(x, t). Feedback controls are functions
(x,m) 7→ vi(x,m) ∈ R
d to be chosen by the two populations. To simplify notation, we omit to
write explicitly a possible dependence on time. We note by v the vector (v1, v2)
∗.
For simplicity, we will assume thatmi(·, t) ∈ L
2(Rn). This allows us to use functional derivatives
in the following sense. For a function f : L2(Rn)2 → Rn, we note by ∂mif the Gaˆteaux derivative
of f with respect to the i-th density, so that for m ∈ L2(Rn)2, m˜ ∈ L2(Rn)2,
d
dθ
f(mi + θm˜i,m−i)
∣∣
θ=0
=
∫
Rn
∂f
∂mi
(m)(ξ) m˜i(ξ) dξ, (1.1)
where i = 1, 2 and −i = 2, 1 respectively. This notion of differentiability will be sufficient for the
purpose of this work. For a more rigorous treatment beyond the L2 setting, one could rely on
3
a more general notion of differentiability introduced by P.-L. Lions in his lectures at Colle`ge de
France [50] and called L-derivative by Carmona and Delarue (see Chapter 5 in [13]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the common mean field control
problem with a single objective function. In some sense it is the simplest model to present because
it does not involve any fixed point argument. By using calculus of variations we derive formally
the adjoint equations and obtain a system of forward-backward PDEs characterizing the optimal
solution. In Section 3, we consider two McKean-Vlasov populations with their own objective
functions. The Nash equilibrium cannot be described with PDEs in finite dimension and in this
case one needs to rely on a system of master equations. In Section 4, we study the corresponding
mean field game settings, and obtain the adjoint equations for common or separated objective
functions, respectively. In Section 5, we provide two types of examples: we first revisit an example
of crowd dynamics from [44, 6] and we then turn our attention to linear-quadratic models, for which
we obtain systems of ODEs that can be related to Riccati equations.
2 Common Mean Field Type Control
2.1 Definition of the problem
In this section, we investigate the situation where a global planner seeks to control in a distributed
fashion two interacting populations driven by McKean-Vlasov dynamics, and tries to minimize a
global cost. This setting can also be construed as a kind of social optimum for two populations
(or two players with MKV dynamics) cooperating in order to minimize a cost which aggregates
their objectives. We call this problem common mean field type control (CMFC for short) and
define it as follows.
Problem 2.1 (CMFC) Find a feedback control vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗ minimizing the functional
JCMFC(v1, v2) =
2∑
i=1
[∫ T
0
∫
Rn
fi(x,m
v
t , vi(x,m
v
t ))m
v
i (x, t)dx dt +
∫
Rn
hi(x,m
v
T )m
v
i (x, T )dx
]
,
(2.1)
where mv = (mv1,m
v
2)
∗ solves the following system of Fokker-Planck (FP) equations: for i = 1, 2,
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx (gi(x,mt, vi(x,mt))mi(x, t))) = 0 , (x, t) ∈ R
n ×R+ , (2.2)
with initial condition mi(x, 0) = ρi,0(x), x ∈ R
n.
The functions
gi : R
n × L2(Rn)2 × Rd → Rn , (x,m, vi) 7→ gi(x,m, vi) , (2.3)
fi : R
n × L2(Rn)2 × Rd → R , (x,m, vi) 7→ fi(x,m, vi) , (2.4)
hi : R
n × L2(Rn)2 → R , (x,m) 7→ hi(x,m) , (2.5)
are assumed to be differentiable with respect to all independent variables. These functions as well
as the control v may also depend on time but we omit it to alleviate the notations. By A∗i we
denote the formal dual operator of the differential operator
Aiϕ(x) = −
n∑
α,β=1
aαβi (x)
∂2ϕ(x)
∂xα∂xβ
.
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We assume sufficient smoothness on the drift functions gi as well as on the feedback, to perform
differentiation as needed. We note that in (2.2) the coupling holds only through the vector m.
One could consider more general cost functions (which can not be decomposed as a sum) but
here we restrict our attention to the form given in (2.1) in order to facilitate the comparison with
a setting where each population has its own cost (see Section 3).
Although we are going to focus on PDE formulations in the rest of this work, let us mention
that this model can also be motivated from a stochastic viewpoint as the optimal control of two
McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Indeed, one can consider a stochastic process Xv = (Xv1 ,X
v
2 ) in R
2n
with the following McKean-Vlasov dynamics
dXvi (t) = gi
(
Xvi (t),
(
L(Xv1 (t)),L(X
v
2 (t))
)∗
, vi
(
Xvi (t),
(
L(Xv1 (t)),L(X
v
2 (t))
)∗))
dt+σi(X
v
i (t)) dWi(t)
for i = 1, 2, with Xv(0) such that Xvi (0) has distribution ρi,0. Here, W = (W1,W2) is a pair of
independent Rn-valued Brownian motions on a probability space (Ω,A,P). Moreover L(Xvi (t))
denotes the distribution of Xvi (t). If we assume that these distributions have densities with respect
to Lebesgue measure which are in L2(Rn), then these densities satisfy, at least formally, the FP
equations (2.2) with ai(x) =
1
2
σi(x)σ
∗
i (x). Moreover, the objective functional (2.1) can be written
as a sum of expectations, which correspond to the expected cost of each player.
2.2 Necessary conditions of optimality
We shall assume the existence of optimal feedbacks (x,m) 7→ vˆi(x,m) and look for necessary
conditions of optimality. We denote by mvˆ = (mvˆ1,m
vˆ
2)
∗ the solutions of (2.2) controlled by vˆ =
(vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗. We consider feedbacks (x,m) 7→ vˆi(x,m) + θv˜i(x,m), θ ∈ R, and we call mi,θ the
corresponding solutions of the FP equations (2.2). Then
mi,θ(x, t)−m
vˆ
i (x, t)
θ
→ m˜i(x, t) pointwise
as θ → 0, solution of
∂m˜i
∂t
(x, t) +A∗i m˜i(x, t) + divx

gi(x,mvˆt , vˆi(x,mvˆt ))m˜i(x, t) +

 2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
(
∂mjgi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ)
+
∂gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
∂mj vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜j(ξ, t)dξ +
∂gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
v˜i(x,m
vˆ
t )

mvˆi (x, t)

 = 0 ,
(2.6)
with the initial condition m˜i(x, 0) = 0. Recall that ∂miϕ(m) denotes the functional derivative of a
functional (m1,m2)
∗ = m 7→ ϕ(m) with respect to mi, as defined by (1.1). Note that m˜ depends
on vˆ and mvˆ, but we omit it to save notation. We next compute the Gaˆteaux derivative of the
5
functional JCMFC as follows
d
dθ
JCMFC(vˆ + θv˜)|θ=0 (2.7)
=
2∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))m˜i(x, t)dxdt
+
2∑
i,j=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
[∫
Rn
(
∂mjfi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ)
+
∂fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
∂mj vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜j(ξ, t)dξ
]
mvˆi (x, t)dxdt
+
2∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
∂fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
v˜i(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
i (x, t)dxdt
+
2∑
i=1
∫
Rn
hi(x,m
vˆ
T )m˜i(x, T )dx +
2∑
i,j=1
∫
Rn
[∫
Rn
∂mjhi(x,m
vˆ
T )(ξ)m˜j(ξ, T )dξ
]
mvˆi (x, T )dx .
We then introduce the functions (x, t) 7→ uvˆi (x, t), i = 1, 2, solutions of the backward equations
−
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) +Aiui(x, t) (2.8)
= fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )) +Dui(x, t).gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
[
∂mifj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂fj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vj
∂mi vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆj (ξ, t)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Duj(ξ, t).
(
∂migj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂gj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vj
∂mi vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)
mvˆj (ξ, t)dξ
with terminal condition
ui(x, T ) = hi(x,m
vˆ
T ) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mihj(ξ,m
vˆ
T )(x)m
vˆ
j (ξ, T ) .
Using (2.8) in (2.7) it follows
d
dθ
JCMFC(vˆ + θv˜)|θ=0
=
2∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
m˜i(x, t)

−∂uvˆi
∂t
(x, t) +Aiu
vˆ
i (x, t)−Du
vˆ
i (x, t).gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
−
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Duvˆj (ξ, t).
(
∂migj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂gj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vj
∂mi vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)
mvˆj (ξ, t)dξ
]
dxdt
+
2∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
∂fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
v˜i(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
i (x, t)dxdt +
2∑
i=1
∫
Rn
uvˆi (x, T )m˜i(x, T )dx .
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Integrating by parts and using (2.6) after rearrangements, we obtain
d
dθ
JCMFC(vˆ + θv˜)|θ=0
=
2∑
i=1
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
[
∂fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
+Duvˆi (x, t).
∂gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
]
v˜i(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
i (x, t)dxdt .
Since v˜i(x,m
vˆ
t ) can be an arbitrary function of (x, t) and m
vˆ
i (x, t) > 0, assuming the matrix a
αβ
i (x)
uniformly positive definite, we necessarily have
∂fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
+Duvˆi (x, t).
∂gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vi
= 0, a.e. x, t . (2.9)
Let us introduce, for i = 1, 2, the Hamiltonians
Hi(x,m, qi) = inf
vi
[
fi(x,m, vi) + qi.gi(x,m, vi)
]
, (2.10)
and the functions (x,m, qi) 7→ vˆi(x,m, qi) which achieve the infima, that is
Hi(x,m, qi) = fi (x,m, vˆi(x,m, qi)) + qi.gi (x,m, vˆi(x,m, qi)) .
We see from (2.9) that
vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ) = vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
i (x, t)) . (2.11)
Hence we have
Hi(x,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
i (x, t)) = fi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )) +Du
vˆ
i (x, t).gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )) , (2.12)
and, by (2.9) and (2.11),
∂Hi
∂qi
(x,mvˆt ,Du
vˆ
i (x, t)) = gi(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(x,m
vˆ
t )) . (2.13)
Moreover,
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂miHj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
j (ξ, t))(x)m
vˆ
j (ξ, t)dξ (2.14)
=
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
[
∂mifj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂fj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vj
∂mi vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆj (ξ, t)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Duvˆj (ξ, t).
[
∂migj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆi(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂gj(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂vj
∂mi vˆj(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆj (ξ, t)dξ .
Therefore (uvˆi ,m
vˆ
i )i=1,2 solve the following system of HJB-FP equations
−
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) +Aiui(x, t) = Hi(x,mt,Dui(x, t)) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂miHj(ξ,mt,Duj(ξ, t))(x)mj(ξ, t)dξ
(2.15)
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx
(
∂Hi
∂qi
(x,mt,Dui(x, t))mi(x, t)
)
= 0 (2.16)
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with terminal and initial condition
ui(x, T ) = hi(x,mT ) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mihj(ξ,mT )(x)mj(ξ, T )dξ , mi(x, 0) = ρi,0(x) ,
where m = (m1,m2)
∗ denotes the vector of solutions of (2.16).
The PDE system (2.15)–(2.16) extends to two populations the PDE system for mean field
control with a single population (see e.g. [8], Chapter 4, page 18). In Section 3, we will present a
different way to extend to two populations the mean field control framework.
Remark 2.2 It is important to notice that finding the solution (ui,mi)i=1,2 of the above PDE
system allows to compute the functions (x, t) 7→ vˆi(x,mt) but not the feedbacks (x,m) 7→ vˆi(x,m).
In other words, the optimal controls can be computed only along the optimal flows of distributions
(that is, the solution t 7→ mt obtained by solving the PDE system), but vˆi(x,m) is not known for
all possible m. This can be known only through the master equations, as we explain below.
2.3 Master and Bellman equations
The notion of master equation (for a single population) has been introduced by P.-L. Lions in the
context of mean field games [50] and has been studied e.g. in [9, 10, 16]. For more details, the
reader is referred to [14].
This section is devoted to the formal introduction of an analogous equation (or, rather, a
system of analogous equations) for two-population CMFC. In this setting, the master equations are
equations for functions (x,m, t) 7→ Ui(x,m, t) such that, in particular, for m solving (2.16), there
holds
ui(x, t) = Ui(x,mt, t). (2.17)
These equations are self-contained, whereas the HJB equations (2.15) for ui are not since they need
to be coupled with the functions mi solutions of the FP equations (2.16). Assuming (2.17) holds,
using the FP equation (2.16) and integration by parts, we obtain
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) =
∂Ui
∂t
(x,mt, t) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjUi(x,mt, t)(ξ)
∂mj
∂t
(ξ, t)dξ
=
∂Ui
∂t
(x,mt, t) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
[
Ajξ +
∂Hj
∂qj
(x,mt,Duj(x, t))Dξ
]
∂mjUi(x,mt, t)(ξ)mj(ξ, t)dξ .
Here, ∂mjUi(x,m, t) denotes a derivative in the sense of (1.1); it is a function of the space variable
and Dξ∂mjUi(x,m, t)(ξ) denotes its gradient. The notation Aiξ is to be understood in a similar
way. Using the adjoint equations (2.15), we identify the master equations
−
∂Ui
∂t
(x,m, t) +AixUi(x,m, t) (2.18)
= −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Ajξ∂mjUi(x,m, t)(ξ)mj(ξ)dξ
+Hi(x,m,DUi(x,m, t)) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂miHj(ξ,mt,DUj(ξ,m, t))(x)mj(ξ, t)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Dξ∂mjUi(x,m, t)(ξ)
∂Hj
∂qj
(ξ,m,DUj(ξ,m, t))mj(ξ)dξ ,
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with terminal condition
Ui(x,m, T ) = hi(x,m) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mihj(ξ,m)(x)mj(ξ)dξ .
We then identify Ui as a functional derivative in mi, namely
Ui(x,m, t) = ∂miV (m, t)(x) , (2.19)
with (m, t) 7→ V (m, t) solution of the Bellman equation
−
∂V
∂t
(m, t) +
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Aj∂mjV (m, t)(x)mj(x)dx =
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Hj(x,m, ∂mjV (m, t)(x))mj(x)dx ,
(2.20)
with terminal condition
V (m,T ) =
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
hj(x,m)mj(x)dx .
Thanks to the functions Ui we can completely characterize the feedbacks by (recall that vˆi minimizes
the Hamiltonian defined by 2.10)
vˆi(x,m) = vˆi(x,m,DUi(x,m, t)) .
Remark 2.3 From (2.19) we can assert that
∂mjUi(x,m, t)(ξ) = ∂miUj(ξ,m, t)(x) = ∂
2
mimj
V (m, t)(x, ξ) . (2.21)
Remark 2.4 The Bellman equation (2.20) could also be obtained directly by a dynamic program-
ming argument similarly to the case of single population, see e.g. [16, 9, 49].
3 Nash Mean Field Type Control Problem
3.1 Definition of the problem
In this section, we consider a situation where the agents among each population cooperate, but the
two populations compete and we try to find a Nash equilibrium between them. A key point is that,
here again, each population chooses a feedback (x,m) 7→ vi(x,m), so we incorporate both m1 and
m2 in the feedback as in the case CMFC. The FP equations describing the evolution of mi(x, t) are
still given by (2.2). However there is not a common cost functional. Instead, each population has
its own functional. We call this problem Nash mean field control (NMFC for short) and define
it as follows.
Problem 3.1 (NMFC) Find a Nash equilibrium vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗ for the cost functionals
JNMFCi (v1, v2) =
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
fi(x,m
v
t , vi(x,m
v
t ))m
v
i (x, t)dxdt +
∫
Rn
hi(x,m
v
T )m
v
i (x, T )dx (3.22)
where mv = (mv1,m
v
2)
∗ satisfies the PDEs (2.2) with initial conditions mi(·, 0) = ρi,0.
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Here again, gi, fi and hi are as in (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) respectively, hence J
CMFC =
∑2
i=1 J
NMFC
i .
Remark 3.2 This situation can also be viewed as a competition between two players, each having
a dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type.
In the sequel vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗ represents a solution to this problem (assuming it exists). In other
words, we have for all v = (v1, v2)
∗
JNMFC1 (vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ J
NMFC
1 (v1, vˆ2) and J
NMFC
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ J
NMFC
2 (vˆ1, v2) .
We shall write necessary conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium vˆ.
3.2 Problem of player 1
For player 1, vˆ2 is a fixed function and vˆ1 solves the following (one-population) MFC problem.
Problem 3.3 (NMFC: Problem of player 1) Minimize
JNMFC1 (v1) = J
NMFC
1 (v1, vˆ2)
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
f1(x,m
v1,vˆ2
t , v1(x,m
v1,vˆ2
t ))m
v1,vˆ2
1 (x, t)dxdt+
∫
Rn
h1(x,m
v1,vˆ2
T )m
v1,vˆ2
1 (x, T )dx (3.23)
where m
v1,vˆ2 =
(
m
v1,vˆ2
1 ,m
v1,vˆ2
2
)∗
solves (2.2) controlled by (v1, vˆ2), that is,
∂m1
∂t
(x, t) +A∗1m1(x, t) + divx(g1(x,mt, v1(x,mt))m1(x, t)) = 0 (3.24)
∂m2
∂t
(x, t) +A∗2m2(x, t) + divx(g2(x,mt, vˆ2(x,mt))m2(x, t)) = 0 (3.25)
with the initial conditions mi(·, 0) = ρi,0.
In this section, we denote by mvˆ = (mvˆ1,m
vˆ
2)
∗ the solutions of (3.24)–(3.25) when player 1 chooses
vˆ1 as a control. Consider a feedback (x,m) 7→ vˆ1(x,m) + θv˜1(x,m) and denote by m1,θ, m2,θ the
corresponding solutions of the FP equations (3.24), (3.25) respectively. Then
m1,θ −m
vˆ
1
θ
(x, t) −−−→
θ→0
m˜1(x, t) ,
m2,θ −m
vˆ
2
θ
(x, t) −−−→
θ→0
m˜−1(x, t) .
Notice that we have written m˜−1(x, t) and not m˜2(x, t) for the second limit. Indeed, we are
considering the problem of player 1, and the second limit describes the impact of his choice on the
second FP equation (3.25). So the index 1 characterizes the first player, and the sign ± refers to
his FP equation or the FP equation of the opponent (player 2). We obtain for m˜1
∂m˜1
∂t
(x, t) +A∗1m˜1(x, t) + divx
{
g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))m˜1(x, t) (3.26)
+
[∫
Rn
(
∂m1g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ) +
∂g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
(
∂m2g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ) +
∂g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜−1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∂g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
v˜1(x,m
vˆ
t )
]
mvˆ1(x, t)
}
= 0 ,
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and for m˜−1
∂m˜−1
∂t
(x, t) +A∗2m˜−1(x, t) + divx
{
g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))m˜−1(x, t) (3.27)
+
[∫
Rn
(
∂m1g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ) +
∂g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m1 vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
(
∂m2g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ)
+
∂g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m2 vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜−1(ξ, t)dξ
]
mvˆ2(x, t)
}
= 0 ,
with the initial conditions
m˜1(x, 0) = 0, m˜−1(x, 0) = 0 .
Similarly to the CMFC case, we can compute
d
dθ
JNMFC1 (vˆ1 + θv˜1)|θ=0 (3.28)
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))m˜1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
[∫
Rn
(
∂m1f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ)
+
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜1(ξ, t)dξ
]
mvˆ1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
[∫
Rn
(
∂m2f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ)
+
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
)
m˜−1(ξ, t)dξ
]
mvˆ1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
v˜1(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫
Rn
h1(x,m
vˆ
T )m˜1(x, T )dx
+
∫
Rn
[∫
Rn
(
∂m1h1(x,m
vˆ
T )(ξ)m˜1(ξ, T ) + ∂m2h1(x,m
vˆ
T )(ξ)m˜−1(ξ, T )
)
dξ
]
mvˆ1(x, T )dx .
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3.3 HJB-FP system for player 1
We introduce the functions uvˆ1, and u
vˆ
−1, solutions of the equations
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t) +A1u1(x, t) (3.29)
= f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) +Du1(x, t).g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
+
∫
Rn
[
∂m1f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Du1(ξ, t).
(
∂m1g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Du−1(ξ, t).
(
∂m1g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m1 vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ2(ξ, t)dξ
with terminal condition
u1(x, T ) = h1(x,m
vˆ
T ) +
∫
Rn
∂m1h1(ξ,m
vˆ
T )(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, T )dξ ,
and
−
∂u−1
∂t
(x, t) +A2u−1(x, t) (3.30)
= Du−1(x, t).g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))
+
∫
Rn
[
∂m2f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Du1(ξ, t).
(
∂m2g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Du−1(ξ, t).
(
∂m2g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m2 vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ2(ξ, t)dξ
with terminal condition
u−1(x, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m2h1(ξ,m
vˆ
T )(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, T )dξ .
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We now use (3.29), (3.30) in (3.28) to obtain
d
dθ
J NMFC1 (vˆ1 + θv˜1)|θ=0
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
m˜1(x, t)
[
−
∂uvˆ1
∂t
(x, t) +A1u
vˆ
1(x, t)−Du
vˆ
1(x, t).g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
−
∫
Rn
{
Duvˆ1(ξ, t).
(
∂m1g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)}
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
−
∫
Rn
{
Duvˆ−1(ξ, t).
(
∂m1g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m1 vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)}
mvˆ2(ξ, t)dξ
]
dxdt+
+
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
m˜−1(x, t)
[
−
∂uvˆ−1
∂t
(x, t) +A2u
vˆ
−1(x, t)−Du
vˆ
−1(x, t).g2(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(x,m
vˆ
t ))
−
∫
Rn
{
Duvˆ1(ξ, t).
(
∂m2g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)}
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
−
∫
Rn
{
Duvˆ−1(ξ, t).
(
∂m2g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x)
+
∂g2(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v2
∂m2 vˆ2(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)}
mvˆ2(ξ, t)dξ
]
dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
v˜1(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
1(x, t)dxdt
+
∫
Rn
m˜1(x, T )u
vˆ
1(x, T )dx+
∫
Rn
m˜−1(x, T )u
vˆ
−1(x, T )dx .
Integrating by parts and using the equations of m˜1, m˜−1, see (3.26), (3.27), we obtain
d
dθ
JNMFC1 (vˆ1 + θv˜1)|θ=0 (3.31)
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
[
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
+Duvˆ1(x, t).
∂g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
]
v˜1(x,m
vˆ
t )m
vˆ
1(x, t)dxdt .
Since this quantity must be 0 for any possible v˜1(x,m), we must have
∂f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
+Duvˆ1(x, t).
∂g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
= 0 . (3.32)
So, using the Hamiltonian notation introduced in (2.10), we have
f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) +Du
vˆ
1(x, t).g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) = H1(x,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(x, t)) , (3.33)
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and∫
Rn
[
∂m1f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Duvˆ1(ξ, t).
(
∂m1g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m1 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
=
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(ξ, t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ , (3.34)
and∫
Rn
[
∂m2f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂f1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
[
Duvˆ1(ξ, t).
(
∂m2g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))(x) +
∂g1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ))
∂v1
∂m2 vˆ1(ξ,m
vˆ
t )(x)
)]
mvˆ1(ξ, t)dξ
=
∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(ξ, t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ . (3.35)
We can write a similar necessary condition for player 2 by introducing u2 and u−2. Unfor-
tunately, this is not sufficient to write a self-contained system for u1, u−1, u2, u−2, m1, and m2.
Unlike the CMFC case, we need to know explicitly the feedback (x,m) 7→ vˆ2(x,m) to express its
functional derivatives ∂m1 vˆ2(x,m)(ξ), ∂m2 vˆ2(x,m)(ξ). This is a major difference with respect to
the CMFC case, in which these terms did not appear. For this reason, in the NMFC problem we
cannot avoid the master equations in general.
Remark 3.4 In some special cases, it is not necessary to introduce the master equations; see
section 5.1 below.
3.4 Master equations
We look for functions (x,m, t) 7→ U1(x,m, t), U−1(x,m, t) such that u
vˆ
1(x, t) = U1(x,m
vˆ
t , t), u
vˆ
−1(x, t) =
U−1(x,m
vˆ
t , t) when m
vˆ solves (2.2) controlled by vˆ. From (3.32) we have, recalling the definition of
vˆ1, see (2.10),
vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ) = vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(x, t)) = vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ,DU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t)) .
We then rewrite (3.33) as
f1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) +Du
vˆ
1(x, t).g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) = H1(x,m
vˆ
t ,DU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t)) , (3.36)
and the right-hand sides of (3.34) and (3.35) become respectively∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(ξ, t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ =
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,DU1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ ,
(3.37)∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,Du
vˆ
1(ξ, t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ =
∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,m
vˆ
t ,DU1(ξ,m
vˆ
t , t))(x)m
vˆ
1(ξ, t)dξ .
(3.38)
In addition, using (3.32), we have the relation
g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )) =
∂H1
∂q1
(x,mvˆt ,DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t)) . (3.39)
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We can then take the functional derivatives of both sides, with respect to m1 and m2 to obtain
∂m1g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ) +
∂g1
∂v1
(x,mvˆt , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))∂m1 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
= ∂m1
∂H1
∂q1
(x,mvˆt ,DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t))(ξ) +
∂2H1
∂q21
(x,mvˆt ,DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t))∂m1DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t)(ξ) , (3.40)
and
∂m2g1(x,m
vˆ
t , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))(ξ) +
∂g1
∂v1
(x,mvˆt , vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t ))∂m2 vˆ1(x,m
vˆ
t )(ξ)
= ∂m2
∂H1
∂q1
(x,mvˆt ,DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t))(ξ) +
∂2H1
∂q21
(x,mvˆt ,DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t))∂m2DxU1(x,m
vˆ
t , t)(ξ) . (3.41)
In equations (3.29), (3.30) we do not need directly (3.40), (3.41) but their equivalent for the
feedback (x,m) 7→ vˆ2(x,m), which involve functions U2, U−2 such that u
vˆ
2(x, t) = U2(x,m
vˆ
t , t),
uvˆ−2(x, t) = U−2(x,m
vˆ
t , t). Finally, we can write (3.29), (3.30) as
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t) +A1u1(x, t) (3.42)
=H1(x,mt,Du1(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,mt,Du1(ξ, t))(x)m1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−1(ξ, t).
[
∂m1
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,mt,Dξu2(ξ, t))(x)
+
∂2H2
∂q22
(ξ,mt,Dxu2(ξ, t))∂m1DξU2(ξ,mt, t)(x)
]
m2(ξ, t)dξ ,
and
−
∂u−1
∂t
(x, t) +A2u−1(x, t) (3.43)
=Dxu−1(x, t).
∂H2
∂q2
(x,mt,Dxu2(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,mt,Du1(ξ, t))(x)m1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−1(ξ, t).
[
∂m2
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,mt,Dξu2(ξ, t))(x)
+
∂2H2
∂q22
(ξ,mt,Dξu2(ξ, t))∂m2DξU2(ξ,mt, t)(x)
]
m2(ξ, t)dξ ,
with terminal conditions
u1(x, T ) = h1(x,mT ) +
∫
Rn
∂m1h1(ξ,mT )(x)m1(ξ, T )dξ
u−1(x, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m2h1(ξ,mT )(x)m1(ξ, T )dξ .
Similarly, we associate equations for u2 and u−2 as follows
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−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t) +A2u2(x, t) (3.44)
=H2(x,mt,Du2(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m2H2(ξ,mt,Du2(ξ, t))(x)m2(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−2(ξ, t).
[
∂m2
∂H1
∂q1
(ξ,mt,Dξu1(ξ, t))(x)
+
∂2H1
∂q21
(ξ,mt,Dxu1(ξ, t))∂m2DξU1(ξ,mt, t)(x)
]
m1(ξ, t)dξ ,
and
−
∂u−2
∂t
(x, t) +A1u−2(x, t) (3.45)
=Dxu−2(x, t).
∂H1
∂q1
(x,mt,Dxu1(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H2(ξ,mt,Du2(ξ, t))(x)m2(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−2(ξ, t).
[
∂m1
∂H1
∂q1
(ξ,mt,Dξu1(ξ, t))(x)
+
∂2H1
∂q21
(ξ,mt,Dξu1(ξ, t))∂m1DξU1(ξ,mt, t)(x)
]
m1(ξ, t)dξ ,
with the terminal conditions
u2(x, T ) = h2(x,mT ) +
∫
Rn
∂m2h2(ξ,mT )(x)m2(ξ, T )dξ ,
u−2(x, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m1h2(ξ,mT )(x)m2(ξ, T )dξ ,
and the FP equations are
∂m1
∂t
+A∗1m1 + divx
(
∂H1
∂q1
(x,mt,Dxu1(x, t))m1
)
= 0 (3.46)
∂m2
∂t
+A∗2m2 + divx
(
∂H2
∂q2
(x,mt,Dxu2(x, t))m2
)
= 0 (3.47)
m1(x, 0) = ρ10(x) , m2(x, 0) = ρ20(x) .
A crucial remark is that the system of 6 equations composed of (3.42), (3.43), (3.44), (3.45),
(3.46), and (3.47), is not self-contained in general since we cannot express ∂m1DξU1(ξ,mt, t)(x),
∂m2DξU1(ξ,mt, t)(x), ∂m2DξU2(ξ,mt, t)(x), and ∂m1DξU2(ξ,mt, t)(x) in terms of u1, u−1, u2, and
16
u−2. So we need to write the system of equations for U1, U−1, U2, and U−2. We obtain
−
∂U1
∂t
(x,m, t) +A1U1(x,m, t) (3.48)
= −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Ajξ∂mjU1(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU1(ξ,m, t)(x).
∂Hj
∂qj
(ξ,m,DξUj(ξ,m, t))mj(ξ)dξ
+H1(x,m,DxU1(x,m, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,m,DU1(ξ,m, t))(x)m1(ξ)dξ
+
∫
Rn
DU−1(ξ,m, t).
[
∂m1
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,m,DξU2(ξ,m, t))(x)
+
∂2H2
∂q22
(ξ,m,DξU2(ξ,m, t))∂m1DξU2(ξ,m, t)(x)
]
m2(ξ)dξ ,
and
−
∂U−1
∂t
(x,m, t) +A2U−1(x,m, t) (3.49)
= −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Ajξ∂mjU−1(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU−1(ξ,m, t)(x).
∂Hj
∂qj
(ξ,m,DξUj(ξ,m, t))mj(ξ)dξ
+DxU−1(x,m, t).
∂H2
∂q2
(x,m,DxU2(x,m, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,m,DU1(ξ,m, t))(x)m1(ξ)dξ
+
∫
Rn
DU−1(ξ,m, t).
[
∂m2
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,m,DξU2(ξ,m, t))(x)
+
∂2H2
∂q22
(ξ,m,DξU2(ξ,m, t))∂m2DξU2(ξ,m, t)(x)
]
m2(ξ)dξ ,
with terminal conditions
U1(x,m, T ) = h1(x,m) +
∫
Rn
∂m1h1(ξ,m)(x)m1(ξ)dξ
U−1(x,m, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m2h1(ξ,m)(x)m1(ξ)dξ .
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Moreover, we have two additional equations for U2, U−2
−
∂U2
∂t
(x,m, t) +A2U2(x,m, t) (3.50)
= −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Ajξ∂mjU2(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU2(ξ,m, t)(x).
∂Hj
∂qj
(ξ,m,DξUj(ξ,m, t))mj(ξ)dξ
+H2(x,m,DxU2(x,m, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m2H2(ξ,m,DξU2(ξ,m, t))(x)m2(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
DU−2(ξ,m, t).
[
∂m2
∂H1
∂q1
(ξ,m,DξU1(ξ,m, t))(x)
+
∂2H1
∂q21
(ξ,m,DξU1(ξ,m, t))∂m2DξU1(ξ,m, t)(x)
]
m1(ξ)dξ ,
and
−
∂U−2
∂t
(x,m, t) +A1U−2(x,m, t) (3.51)
= −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
Ajξ∂mjU−2(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ
+
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU−2(ξ,m, t)(x).
∂Hj
∂qj
(ξ,m,DξUj(ξ,m, t))mj(ξ)dξ
+DxU−2(x,m, t).
∂H1
∂q1
(x,m,DxU1(x,m, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H2(ξ,m,DU2(ξ,m, t))(x)m2(ξ)dξ
+
∫
Rn
DU−2(ξ,m, t).
[
∂m1
∂H1
∂q1
(ξ,m,DξU1(ξ,m, t))(x)
+
∂2H1
∂q21
(ξ,m,DξU1(ξ,m, t))∂m1DξU1(ξ,m, t)(x)
]
m1(ξ)dξ ,
with terminal conditions
U2(x,m, T ) = h2(x,m) +
∫
Rn
∂m2h2(ξ,m)(x)m2(ξ)dξ ,
U−2(x,m, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m1h2(ξ,m)(x)m2(ξ)dξ .
The system of four master equations (3.48), (3.49), (3.50), (3.51) for the functions U1, U−1, U2,
U−2 is self-contained.
Recall that in our notation, the subscript “−1” does not mean “2”. Here U−1 stems from the
problem of player 1 and reflects the impact of the variation of the state of the opponent. This
intuition is made more precise in the next subsection.
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3.5 Bellman system
We can check that
U1(x,m, t) = ∂m1V1(m, t)(x) , U−1(x,m, t) = ∂m2V1(m, t)(x) , (3.52)
U2(x,m, t) = ∂m2V2(m, t)(x) , U−2(x,m, t) = ∂m1V2(m, t)(x) , (3.53)
where (m, t) 7→ V1(m, t), V2(m, t) solve of the Bellman system
0 =
∂V1
∂t
(m, t)−
∫
Rn
A1x∂m1V1(m, t)(x)m1(x)dx−
∫
Rn
A2x∂m2V1(m, t)(x)m2(x)dx (3.54)
+
∫
Rn
H1(x,m,Dx∂m1V1(m, t)(x))m1(x)dx
+
∫
Rn
Dx∂m2V1(m, t)(x).
∂H2
∂q2
(x,m,Dx∂m2V2(m, t)(x))m2(x)dx ,
with terminal condition
V1(m,T ) =
∫
Rn
h1(x,m)m1(x)dx ,
and
0 =
∂V2
∂t
(m, t)−
∫
Rn
A1x∂m1V2(m, t)(x)m1(x)dx−
∫
Rn
A2x∂m2V2(m, t)(x)m2(x)dx (3.55)
+
∫
Rn
H2(x,m,Dx∂m2V2(m, t)(x))m2(x)dx
+
∫
Rn
Dx∂m1V2(m, t)(x).
∂H1
∂q1
(x,m,Dx∂m1V1(m, t)(x))m1(x)dx ,
with terminal condition
V2(m,T ) =
∫
Rn
h2(x,m)m2(x)dx .
Remark 3.5 To recover the equations (3.48) to (3.51) by taking the functional derivatives of Bell-
man equations, one needs to use the following symmetry properties stemming from (3.52)–(3.53)
∂m2U1(x,m, t)(ξ) = ∂m1U−1(ξ,m, t)(x) , ∂m1U2(x,m, t)(ξ) = ∂m2U−1(ξ,m, t)(x) .
Remark 3.6 After completion of this work, it has been brought to our attention that similar prob-
lems have been studied recently under the term mean field type games, see e.g. [54] for the
general setting and [23] for a collection of applications to engineering. However, to the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first, at this level of generality, to provide a comprehensive framework
and to focus on the necessary conditions of optimality formulated in terms of PDEs.
4 Mean Field Game Problems
In this section, we consider the interaction of two populations when the agents of each population
are rational (i.e., try to minimize an individual cost and anticipate the rationality of other the
players) and we look for non-cooperative equilibrium using a mean field game approach. For a
single population, the mean field game viewpoint focuses on Nash equilibria among the population
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and, as such, the problem is defined through a fixed point procedure: first, given the distribution
of the other players’ states, an infinitesimal player finds her best response (that is, her optimal
control) in order to minimize her cost; second, the distribution driven by the optimal control found
in the first step should correspond to the distribution of the population. The reader is referred
to e.g. [8] (Chapter 2) and [15] for more details. This idea can be extended to the case of several
populations. The PDE system is expressed e.g. in [8] (Chapter 8, page 68) and in [13] (Chapter 7,
page 625) in the setting that has been the most usual in the literature so far. Analogously to the
mean field control approach, we will distinguish between two types of problems.
4.1 Nash Mean Field Game
Let us start with a setting where each player compete with all the other players. We call it Nash
mean field game (NMFG for short). In this problem each infinitesimal agent considers that the
distributions of both populations are fixed and tries to minimize her own individual cost. Fixing the
state of all the other players is translated, in the mean field limit, by the fact that the probabilities
m = (m1,m2)
∗ entering in the functions fi(x,m, vi), gi(x,m, vi), hi(x,m) are considered as fixed
parameters. For this reason, we look for feedbacks depending on x only instead of (x,m), that is,
the controls are functions x 7→ vi(x).
Problem 4.1 (NMFG) Find (mˆ, vˆ) satisfying the two conditions
1. vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗ is a Nash equilibrium for the functionals
JNMFGi,mˆ (v1, v2) =
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
fi(x, mˆt, vi(x))m
v,mˆ
i (x, t)dxdt+
∫
Rn
hi(x, mˆT )m
v,mˆ
i (x, T )dx
where mv,mˆ = (mv,mˆ1 ,m
v,mˆ
2 )
∗ satisfies
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx
(
gi(x, mˆt, vi(x))mi(x, t)
)
= 0 ,
with initial conditions mi(·, 0) = ρi,0.
2. mˆ = mvˆ = (mvˆ1,m
vˆ
2)
∗ is a solution to (4.61) controlled by vˆ.
The first condition means that, for a given mˆ, for any v,
JNMFG1,mˆ (vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ J
NMFG
1,mˆ (v1, vˆ2) and J
NMFG
2,mˆ (vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ J
NMFG
2,mˆ (vˆ1, v2) .
The problem of player 1 is the following.
Problem 4.2 (NMFG: Problem of player 1) Find vˆ1 minimizing
JNMFG1 (v1) = J
NMFG
1,mˆ (v1, vˆ2)
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
f1 (x, mˆt, v1 (x))m
v1,vˆ2,mˆ
1 (x, t)dxdt +
∫
Rn
h1 (x, mˆT )m
v1,vˆ2,mˆ
1 (x, T )dx
where
(
mv1,vˆ2,mˆ1 ,m
v1,vˆ2,mˆ
2
)
solves
∂m1
∂t
(x, t) +A∗1m1(x, t) + divx
(
g1 (x, mˆt, v1 (x))m1(x, t)
)
= 0 , (4.56)
∂m2
∂t
(x, t) +A∗2m2(x, t) + divx
(
g2 (x, mˆt, vˆ2 (x))m2(x, t)
)
= 0 , (4.57)
with initial conditions mi(·, 0) = ρi,0.
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By comparing Problem 4.2 and Problem 3.3, we see that in order to derive the necessary optimality
conditions, we can reuse the computations done in the NMFC setting but now with a fixed param-
eter mˆ = (mˆ1, mˆ2)
∗, and impose a posteriori that mˆ = (mˆ1, mˆ2)
∗ should solve the FP equations.
We shall only provide the equations and skip the proof to alleviate the presentation. This leads to
the PDE system
−
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) +Aiui(x, t) = Hi(x,mt,Dui(x, t)) (4.58)
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx
(
∂Hi
∂qi
(x,mt,Dui(x, t))mi(x, t)
)
= 0 (4.59)
with terminal and initial conditions
ui(x, T ) = hi(x,mT ) , mi(x, 0) = ρi,0(x) .
This corresponds to the PDE system obtained in [8] (Chapter 8, page 68), for which the mean field
problem had not been written explicitly but which has been shown to provide an approximate Nash
equilibrium for a finite player game where all the players compete. We refer the interested reader
to [8] and [13] for more details.
4.2 Common Mean Field Game
We now consider a different viewpoint where, in analogy with the CMFC setting, there is only
one (common) cost functional. We introduce the following problem, that we call common mean
field game (CMFG for short). Here again, the states of the populations are fixed so we look for
feedbacks as functions of x only instead of (x,m).
Problem 4.3 (CMFG) Find (mˆ, vˆ) satisfying the two conditions
1. vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∗ minimizes
JCMFGmˆ (v1, v2) =
2∑
i=1
[∫ T
0
∫
Rn
fi(x, mˆt, vi(x))m
v,mˆ
i (x, t)dx dt +
∫
Rn
hi(x, mˆT )m
v,mˆ
i (x, T )dx
]
,
(4.60)
where mv,mˆ = (mv,mˆ1 ,m
v,mˆ
2 )
∗ satisfies the following PDE system
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx
(
gi(x, mˆt, vi(x))mi(x, t)
)
= 0 , (4.61)
with initial conditions mi(·, 0) = ρi,0.
2. mˆ = mvˆ,mˆ is a solution to (4.61) controlled by vˆ.
The control problem appearing in the first point above is solved ignoring the parameters mˆ1, mˆ2.
Eventually the value of these parameters is defined a posteriori, by a fixed point argument, equaling
these parameters to the solution of the FP equations (4.61). We can use this viewpoint to apply the
CMFC considered in section 2. Referring to the system (2.15) of HJB-FP equations, it turns out
that we recover the equations (4.58)–(4.59) with the same terminal and initial conditions. Hence
the necessary optimality conditions of the two mean field games (Problems 4.1 and 4.3) have the
same PDE system. In other words, we have two different interpretations for this PDE system. This
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similarity between the NMFG and the CMFG problems is not entirely surprising since, by looking
at the definition of Problem 4.3, one realizes that the problem can be split into two sub-problems
(one minimization problem for each component of v) which are independent because mˆ = (mˆ1, mˆ2)
∗
is fixed.
Although, as described above, one can reuse the computations done in the CMFC setting to
derive the PDE system of CMFG, the difference between the two PDE systems should be stressed:
the HJB equation (4.58) does not involve derivatives of the Hamiltonians with respect to mi,
i = 1, 2, whereas in (2.15) such derivatives do appear.
Remark 4.4 Studying rigorously the corresponding N -player game is an important question which
is beyond the scope of the present work. However, at least at a heuristic level, the CMFG problem
described above can be viewed as the mean field limit of a game with a finite number of players in at
least two ways. One could imagine that the state of each player has two components, each with its
own dynamics, and the player chooses a control for each component in order to minimize her global
cost (which depends on both components). One could also consider a game with two populations of
equal size, say (Xi1)i=1,...,N and (X
i
2)i=1,...,N , where the players work in pairs: X
i
1 and X
i
2 help each
other and compete with ((Xjk)k=1,2)j 6=i. This would be a game representing competition between
couples composed of one player from each population: the players collaborate among each pair but
compete at a global level.
Remark 4.5 The adjoint equations (4.58) may also be deduced with an approach based on the
master equation point of view. We omit the details.
5 Examples
5.1 Special cases
Let us start with some situations in which the system of master equations is not needed and one
can work instead with a system of PDEs in finite dimension. For future reference (see also the
examples below), we report here two cases of interest for many applications. To the best of our
knowledge, the examples studied in the literature so far fall in one of these cases.
Special case 1: When deriving the necessary optimality conditions in the previous sections, we
have looked for controls under the form of functions of both x andm = (m1,m2)
∗. This corresponds
to a situation where each player observes her individual state together with both distributions. If,
instead, one considers a more restricted information structure according to which the agents do not
have access to the distributions, then one should look for controls under the form of functions of x
only, i.e. x 7→ vi(x). In this case, the optimal controls, in particular, are not allowed to depend on
m. Hence in (3.29)–(3.30) and in the analogous equations for u2, u−2, the terms (∂mi vˆj)i=1,2,j=1,2
vanish. We can thus write a self-contained PDE system for u1, u−1, u2, u−2, m1, and m2 in the
NMFC setting. Indeed, the equations (3.42)–(3.43) for u1, u−1 of NMFC become
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t) +A1u1(x, t) (5.62)
=H1(x,mt,Du1(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,mt,Du1(ξ, t))(x)m1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−1(ξ, t).∂m1
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,mt,Dξu2(ξ, t))(x)m2(ξ, t)dξ ,
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and
−
∂u−1
∂t
(x, t) +A2u−1(x, t) (5.63)
=Dxu−1(x, t).
∂H2
∂q2
(x,mt,Dxu2(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m2H1(ξ,mt,Du1(ξ, t))(x)m1(ξ, t)dξ
+
∫
Rn
Du−1(ξ, t).∂m2
∂H2
∂q2
(ξ,mt,Dξu2(ξ, t))(x)m2(ξ, t)dξ ,
with terminal conditions
u1(x, T ) = h1(x,mT ) +
∫
Rn
∂m1h1(ξ,mT )(x)m1(ξ, T )dξ
u−1(x, T ) =
∫
Rn
∂m2h1(ξ,mT )(x)m1(ξ, T )dξ .
For u2 and u−2 similar equations hold, and the FP equations remain (3.46)–(3.47).
Special case 2: If the controls are functions of x only (as in the first special case above), and in
addition g1 does not depend upon m2 and g2 does not depend on m1, then the unknowns u−1 and
u−2 become superfluous and we can write a self-contained PDE system for u1, u2,m1,m2. Indeed,
for NMFC, the equation (5.62) for u1 simplifies further and we obtain
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t) +A1u1(x, t) (5.64)
=H1(x,mt,Du1(x, t)) +
∫
Rn
∂m1H1(ξ,mt,Du1(ξ, t))(x)m1(ξ, t)dξ ,
with terminal condition
u1(x, T ) = h1(x,mT ) +
∫
Rn
∂m1h1(ξ,mT )(x)m1(ξ, T )dξ .
A similar equation holds for u2 and the FP equations remain (3.46)–(3.47). Notice the difference
between (5.64) and the corresponding equation for CMFC, namely (2.15).
5.2 Aversion in crowd motion
We briefly revisit examples of aversion in crowd motion, in the framework of this paper. For the
FP equations, we let
A∗im
i = −
σ2
2
∆mi, gi(x,m, vi) = vi,
where σ > 0 is a constant. In other words, the drift is the control, and the diffusion is a standard
diffusion with constant volatility σ. In particular, g1 (resp. g2) does not depend upon m2 (resp.
m1).
Model of Lachapelle and Wolfram [44]. In [44], the authors considered costs of the form
fi(x,m, vi) = χ(vi) + ϕi,λ(m(x)) , hi(x,m) = ψi(x) ,
χ(v) =
|v|2
2
, ϕ1,λ(µ1, µ2) = µ1 + λµ2, ϕ2,λ(µ1, µ2) = µ2 + λµ1 ,
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where λ > 0 is a constant and ψi : R
n → R. In fi, the terms ϕi,λ model aversion (of an agent
towards its own population or the other population). Notice that these costs are local in m, in the
sense that they depend only on the value of the density at the point x under consideration. The
FP equation for mi becomes:
∂mi
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆mi(x, t) + divx (vi(x, t)mi(x, t)) = 0 .
The Hamiltonians defined by (2.10) are
H1(x,m, q1) = −
1
2
|q1|
2 +m1(x) + λm2(x) , H2(x,m, q2) = −
1
2
|q2|
2 +m2(x) + λm1(x) .
For the CMFC model, the adjoint equations are
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+ 2 [m1(x) + λm2(x)]
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+ 2 [m2(x) + λm1(x)] ,
whereas for the NMFC model, if the controls are allowed to depend only on x (as in [44, Proposition
4.1]; see also [41, Chapter 4, Proposition 4.2.1] and its proof), the adjoint equations are
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+ 2m1(x) + λm2(x)
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+ 2m2(x) + λm1(x) .
We recover the equations found in [44, Proposition 4.1] and, as noticed by Lachapelle and Wolfram,
the adjoint equations for CMFC and NMFC are equivalent up to multiplying λ by a constant.
For both CMFG and NMFG, the system of adjoint equations is given by
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+m1(x) + λm2(x)
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+m2(x) + λm1(x) .
If the controls are allowed to depend on both x and m, the necessary optimality conditions
for NMFC are expressed in terms of master equations: the system (3.48)–(3.51) rewrites, in this
setting:
−
∂U1
∂t
(x,m, t)−
σ2
2
∆xU1(x,m, t)
=
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
σ2
2
∆ξ∂mjU1(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU1(ξ,m, t)(x).DξUj(ξ,m, t)mj(ξ)dξ
−
1
2
|DxU1(x,m, t)|
2 + 2m1(x) + λm2(x)−
∫
Rn
DU−1(ξ,m, t).∂m1DξU2(ξ,m, t)(x)m2(ξ)dξ ,
and
−
∂U−1
∂t
(x,m, t)−
σ2
2
∆xU−1(x,m, t)
=
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
σ2
2
∆ξ∂mjU−1(ξ,m, t)(x)mj(ξ)dξ −
2∑
j=1
∫
Rn
∂mjDξU−1(ξ,m, t)(x).DξUj(ξ,m, t)mj(ξ)dξ
−DxU−1(x,m, t).DxU2(x,m, t) + λm1(x)−
∫
Rn
DU−1(ξ,m, t).∂m2DξU2(ξ,m, t)(x)m2(ξ)dξ ,
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complemented with terminal conditions and analogous equations for U2, U−2.
Model of Aurell and Djehiche [6]. In [6], the authors considered a variant of the above
model with non-local running cost of the form
fi(x,m, vi) = χ(vi) + Φi,Λ(x,m) ,
χ(v) =
|v|2
2
, Φi,Λ(x,m) =
2∑
k=1
Λi,k φ ∗ µk(x) ,
where Λi,k ≥ 0 are constants, ∗ denotes the convolution and φ : R
n → R is a smooth function such
as
φ(x) = γδ ∗ IBr (x) , γδ(x) = γ(x/δ)/δ , (5.65)
where δ > 0, γ is a mollifier, and IBr is the indicator function of the ball with radius r centered at
0 normalized by the volume of this ball. Here, Φi,Λ models aversion. For the sake of comparison,
let us consider the case where the controls are functions of x and do not depend upon m (see [6],
Assumption (C4) p. 444). One can check that this example also falls in the second special case of
section 5.1.
For the CMFC model, the adjoint equations are
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ1,k φ ∗mk,t(x) +
2∑
j=1
Λj,1 φ ∗mj,t(x)
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ2,k φ ∗mk,t(x) +
2∑
j=1
Λj,2 φ ∗mj,t(x) ,
whereas for the NMFC model, the adjoint equations are
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ1,k φ ∗mk,t(x) + Λ1,1 φ ∗m1,t(x)
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ2,k φ ∗mk,t(x) + Λ2,2 φ ∗m2,t(x) ,
where φ(x) = φ(−x). Similarly to the example of [44] and as noticed in [6], the NMFC system can
be seen as a CMFC system (up to changing the coefficients Λi,k by a multiplicative constant) if one
assumes that Λ1,2 = Λ2,1 and φ is even (which is the case with (5.65) for example).
For both CMFG and NMFG, the system of adjoint equations is given by
−
∂u1
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u1(x, t) = −
|∇u1(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ1,k φ ∗mk,t(x)
−
∂u2
∂t
(x, t)−
σ2
2
∆u2(x, t) = −
|∇u2(x)|
2
2
+
2∑
k=1
Λ2,k φ ∗mk,t(x) .
Remark 5.1 Here again, if the controls were allowed to depend on both x and m, the necessary
optimality conditions for NMFC would be expressed in terms of the master equations (3.48)–(3.51).
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5.3 Linear-quadratic models
In this section, we consider the linear-quadratic setting. In the case of a single population, we refer
the reader to, e.g., the papers [36, 37, 11], the monographs [8] (Chapter 6) and [13] (Section 3.5),
as well as the references therein. In the case of several populations, a model with a finite number
of agents has been studied in [5]. Here we focus on the limit mean field models, in the different
cases of interactions introduced above.
In the sequel, for m ∈ L2(Rn)2, we denote by mk =
∫
xmk(x)dx the first moment of mk. We
will denote by ϕ˙ the time derivative of a function ϕ.
We consider, for x ∈ Rn,m = (m1,m2) ∈ L
2(Rn)2, vi ∈ R
d, drift and cost functions of the form:
gi(x,m, vi) = A
ix+
2∑
j=1
A
i
jmj +B
ivi (5.66)
fi(x,m, vi) =
1
2

x∗Qix+ (vi)∗Rivi + 2∑
j=1
(
x− Sijmj
)∗
Q
i
j
(
x− Sijmj
) (5.67)
hi(x,m) =
1
2

x∗QiTx+ 2∑
j=1
(
x− SiT,jmj
)∗
Q
i
T,j
(
x− SiT,jmj
) , (5.68)
where Ai,A
i
j , and B
i are bounded deterministic matrix-valued functions in time of suitable sizes,
Sij (respectively Q
i,Q
i
j and R
i) are bounded deterministic (respectively, non-negative and positive
definite) matrix-valued functions in time of suitable sizes. Except for t = T , we omit the dependence
on time to alleviate the notations. Moreover M∗ denotes the transpose of a matrix M .
In this setting the Fokker-Planck equation (2.2) rewrites
∂mi
∂t
(x, t) +A∗imi(x, t) + divx



Aix+ 2∑
j=1
A
i
jmj,t +B
ivi(x, t)

mi(x, t)

 = 0 . (5.69)
Common mean field control problem. We first investigate the CMFC problem. We look
for adjoint states of the form
ui(x, t) =
1
2
x∗P itx+ x
∗νit + τ
i
t . (5.70)
We have Dui(x, t) = P
i
tx+ ν
i
t .
The Hamiltonian (2.10) rewrites, for x ∈ Rn,m = (m1,m2)
∗ ∈ L2(Rn)2, qi ∈ R
n, as
Hi(x,m, qi) = q
∗
i

Aix+ 2∑
j=1
A
i
jmj

− 1
2
q∗iB
i(Ri)−1(Bi)∗qi
+
1
2

x∗Qix+ 2∑
j=1
(
x− Sijmj
)∗
Q
i
j
(
x− Sijmj
) , (5.71)
since vˆi(x,m, qi) = −(R
i)−1(Bi)∗qi.
Using (5.69) and taking into account the expression of vˆ, the first moments mi of mi solve the
system of ODEs
m˙i,t = A
imi,t +
2∑
j=1
A
i
jmj,t −B
i(Ri)−1(Bi)∗P itmi,t −B
i(Ri)−1(Bi)∗νit , (5.72)
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and the initial condition mi(0) =
∫
xρi,0(x)dx.
We see that the integral term in (2.15) rewrites
∫ 2∑
j=1
∂miHj(ξ,m,Duj(ξ, t))(x)mj(ξ, t)dξ =
2∑
j=1
[(
P jt mj,t + ν
j
t
)∗
A
j
i −
(
mj,t − S
j
imi,t
)∗
Q
j
iS
j
i
]
x.
(5.73)
Replacing ui by its expression (5.70) in the adjoint equation (2.15), we obtain that (P
1, P 2),
(ν1, ν2) and (τ1, τ2) solve the following system of ODEs, which is coupled with the equations on
the first moments (5.72),
P˙ it + (P
i
t )
∗Ai + (Ai)∗P it − (P
i
t )
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗P it +Q
i +
2∑
j=1
Q
i
j = 0
− ν˙it =
[
(Ai)∗ − (P it )
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗
]
νit +
1
2
2∑
j=1
[
(P it )
∗A
i
j + (A
i
j)
∗P it −Q
i
jS
i
j − (S
i
j)
∗Q
i
j
]
mj,t
+
2∑
k=1
[
(A
k
i )
∗
(
P kt mk,t + ν
k
t
)
− (Ski )
∗Q
k
i
(
mk,t − S
k
imi,t
)]
− τ˙ it = tr a
iP it +
2∑
j=1
(νit)
∗A
i
jmj,t −
1
2
(νit)
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗νit +
1
2
2∑
j=1
(
Sijmj,t
)∗
Q
i
j
(
Sijmj,t
)
,
with the terminal conditions
P iT = Q
i
T +
2∑
j=1
Q
i
T,j
νiT = −
2∑
j=1
Q
i
T,jS
i
T,jmj,T −
2∑
k=1
(SkT,i)
∗Q
k
T,i
(
mk,T − S
k
T,imi,T
)
τ iT =
1
2
2∑
j=1
(
SiT,jmj,T
)∗
Q
i
T,jS
i
T,jmj,T .
We can relate this system of ODEs to a Riccati equation as follows. Let us look for Ki such
that
Kitmi,t =
∫
Rn
Dui(x, t)mi(x, t)dx. (5.74)
Taking the derivative (with respect to time) on both sides of the above equality, using that νi =
(Ki − P i)mi, and using the equations for P˙
i
t and ν˙
i
t yields
K˙itmi,t =

KitBi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗Kit −Kit (Ai +Aii)− (Ai +Aii)∗Kit −Qi − 2∑
j=1
Q
i
j
+Q
i
iS
i
i + (S
i
i)
∗Q
i
i −
2∑
j=1
(Sji )
∗Q
j
iS
j
i

mi,t
+
[
−KitA
i
−i −A
−i
i K
−i
t + (S
−i
i )
∗Q
−i
i +Q
i
−iS
i
−i
]
m−i(t).
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This system of equations can be synthetically written under the following form, which turns out to
be a symmetric Riccati equation
K˙t = KtBKt − (A+A)
∗Kt −Kt(A+A) +G, KT = GT ,
where
K =
(
K1 0
0 K2
)
,B =
(
B1(R1)−1(B1)∗ 0
0 B2(R2)−1(B2)∗
)
,A =
(
A1 0
0 A2
)
,A =
(
A
1
1 A
1
2
A
2
1 A
2
2
)
,
(5.75)
and
G =
(
G11 G
2
1
G12 G
2
2
)
with
Gii = −Q
i −
2∑
j=1
Q
i
j +Q
i
iS
i
i + (S
i
i)
∗Q
i
i −
2∑
j=1
(Sji )
∗Q
j
iS
j
i
G−ii = (S
−i
i )
∗Q
−i
i +Q
i
−iS
i
−i .
and, for the final condition, GT is defined similarly.
Mean field game. We focus on the system (4.58)–(4.59). We look for ui under the form
ui(x, t) =
1
2
x∗P itx+ x
∗νit + τ
i
t . (5.76)
Following the same approach as above for the CMFC problem and noting that the integral term (5.73)
does not appear in the adjoint equation (4.58) for CMFG, we obtain that m satisfies (5.72) and
P i, νi, τ i satisfy the system of ODEs
P˙ it + (P
i
t )
∗Ai + (Ai)∗P it − (P
i
t )
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗P it +Q
i +
2∑
j=1
Q
i
j = 0
− ν˙it =
[
(Ai)∗ − (P it )
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗
]
νit +
1
2
2∑
j=1
[
(P it )
∗A
i
j + (A
i
j)
∗P it −Q
i
jS
i
j − (S
i
j)
∗Q
i
j
]
mj,t
− τ˙ it = tr a
iP it +
2∑
j=1
(νit)
∗A
i
jmj,t −
1
2
(νit)
∗Bi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗νit +
1
2
2∑
j=1
(
Sijmj,t
)∗
Q
i
j
(
Sijmj,t
)
,
with the terminal conditions
P iT = Q
i
T +
2∑
j=1
Q
i
T,j
νiT = −
2∑
j=1
Q
i
T,jS
i
T,jm
j
T
τ iT =
1
2
2∑
j=1
(
SiT,jm
j
T
)∗
Q
i
T,jS
i
T,jm
j
T .
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Here again, we can relate this system of ODEs to a Riccati equation as follows. Let us look for
Ki such that
Kitmi,t =
∫
Rn
Dui(x, t)mi(x, t)dx.
Taking the derivative (with respect to time) on both sides of the above equality and using the
equations for P it and ν
i
t yields
K˙itmi,t =

KitBi(Ri)−1(Bi)∗Kit −KitAi − (Ai)∗Kit −KitAii −Qi − 2∑
j=1
Q
i
j +Q
i
iS
i
i

mi,t
−
[
KitA
i
−i +Q
i
−iS
i
−i
]
m−it .
This system of equations can be written under the following compact form which turns out to be
a non-symmetric Riccati equation
K˙t = KtBKt −A
∗Kt −KtA−KtA+ G˜, KT = G˜T , (5.77)
where B,A, and A are defined by (5.75), and
G˜ =
(
G˜11 G˜
2
1
G˜12 G˜
2
2
)
with
G˜ii = −Q
i −
2∑
j=1
Q
i
j +
1
2
(
Q
i
iS
i
i + (S
i
i)
∗Q
i
i
)
G˜−ii =
1
2
(
Q
i
−iS
i
−i + (S
i
−i)
∗Q
i
−i
)
,
and, for the final condition, G˜T is defined similarly.
Remark 5.2 In particular, by comparing (5.74) and (5.77), one can see that linear-quadratic
CMFC and CMFG are in general different. One can also check that the NMFC problem provides
yet a different system of ODEs since this LQ model does not fall in the second special case of
section 5.1. Details are omitted here and a study of this LQ setting with a comparison of all the
ODE systems will be done elsewhere.
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